Decision no. 2011-625 DC of 10 March 2011

In the conditions provided for by Article 61-2 of the Constitution, the Constitutional Council was seized of an application relating to the Law on guidelines and programming for the performance of internal security on 15 February 2011 by Mr Jean-Marc AYRAULT, Ms Sylvie ANDRIEUX, Messrs Gérard BAPT, Claude BARTOLONE, Jacques BASCOU, Christian BATAILLE, Ms Delphine BATHO, Ms Marie-Noëlle BATTISTEL, Messrs Serge BLISKO, Patrick BLOCHE, Daniel BOISSERIE, Ms Marie-Odile BOUILLÉ, Ms Monique BOULESTIN, Messrs Pierre BOURGUIGNON, François BROTTES, Alain CACHEUX, Thierry CARCENAC, Guy CHAMBEFORT, Jean-Michel CLÉMENT, Gilles COCQUEMPOT, Pierre COHEN, Ms Pascale CROZON, Messrs Frédéric CUVILLIER, Pascal DEGUILHEM, François DELUGA, Bernard DEROSIER, Michel DESTOT, René DOSIÈRE, Julien DRAY, Jean-Pierre DUFAU, William DUMAS, Jean-Louis DUMONT, Ms Laurence DUMONT, Messrs Jean-Paul DUPRÉ, Olivier DUSSOPT, Christian ECKERT, Hervé FÉRON, Pierre FORGUES, Ms Valérie FOURNEYRON, Mr Jean-Louis GAGNAIRE, Ms Geneviève GAILLARD, Messrs Jean-Patrick GILLE, Joël GIRAUD, Jean GLAVANY, Daniel GOLDBERG, Marc GOUA, Ms Élisabeth GUIGOU, Mr David HABIB, Ms Danièle HOFFMAN-RISPAL, Ms Sandrine HUREL, Ms Françoise IMBERT, Messrs Michel ISSINDOU, Serge JANQUIN, Henri JIBRAYEL, Régis JUANICO, Ms Marietta KARAMANLI, Messrs Jérôme LAMBERT, Jack LANG, Ms Colette LANGLADE, Mr Jean-Yves LE BOUILLONNEC, Ms Annick LE LOCH, Mr Bruno LE ROUX, Ms Catherine LEMORTON, Ms Annick LEPETIT, Messrs Bernard LESTERLIN, Albert LIKUVALU, François LONCLE, Jean MALLOT, Ms Jeanny MARC, Ms Marie-Lou MARCEL, Messrs Jean-René MARSAC, Philippe MARTIN, Ms Frédérique MASSAT, Mr Didier MATHUS, Ms Sandrine MAZETIER, Messrsr Pierre-Alain MUET, Philippe NAUCHE, Henri NAYROU, Alain NÉRI, Ms George PAU-LANGEVIN, Messrs Germinal PEIRO, Jean-Luc PÉRAT, Ms Marie-Françoise PÉROL-DUMONT, Ms Martine PINVILLE, Messrs Philippe PLISSON, François PUPPONI, Ms Catherine QUÉRÉ, Messrs Jean-Jack QUEYRANNE, Dominique RAIMBOURG, Simon RENUCCI, René ROUQUET, Alain ROUSSET, Michel SAPIN, Jean-Louis TOURAINE, Jean-Jacques URVOAS, André VALLINI, Manuel VALLS, Michel VAUZELLE, Michel VERGNIER, André VÉZINHET, Alain VIDALIES, Jean-Claude VIOLLET, Ms Marie-Hélène AMIABLE, Mr François ASENSI, Ms Martine BILLARD, Messrs Alain BOCQUET, Patrick BRAOUEZEC, Jean-Pierre BRARD, Ms Marie-George BUFFET, Messrs Jean-Jacques CANDELIER, André CHASSAIGNE, Jacques DESALLANGRE, Marc DOLEZ, Ms Jacqueline FRAYSSE, Messrs André GERIN, Pierre GOSNAT, Maxime GREMETZ, Jean-Paul LECOQ, Roland MUZEAU, Daniel PAUL, Jean-Claude SANDRIER, Michel VAXÈS, Yves COCHET, Noël MAMÈRE, François de RUGY, Ms Anny POURSINOFF, Ms Huguette BELLO and Mr Alfred MARIE-JEANNE, Members of Parliament,

and on the same day by Mr Jean-Pierre BEL, Ms Jacqueline ALQUIER, Ms Michèle ANDRÉ, Messrs Serge ANDREONI, Bernard ANGELS, Alain ANZIANI, David ASSOULINE, Bertrand AUBAN, Claude BÉRIT-DÉBAT, Ms Marie-Christine BLANDIN, Ms Maryvonne BLONDIN, Mr Yannick BODIN, Ms Nicole BONNEFOY, Mr Yannick BOTREL, Ms Alima BOUMEDIENE-THIERY, Mr Martial BOURQUIN, Ms Bernadette BOURZAI, Mr Michel BOUTANT, Ms Nicole BRICQ, Mr Jean-Pierre CAFFET, Ms Claire-Lise CAMPION, Mr Jean-Louis CARRÈRE, Ms Françoise CARTRON, Messrs Bernard CAZEAU, Yves CHASTAN, Pierre-Yves COLLOMBAT, Yves DAUDIGNY, Marc DAUNIS, Ms Christiane DEMONTÈS, Mr Jean DESESSARD, Ms Josette DURRIEU, Messrs Jean-Luc FICHET, Bernard FRIMAT, Ms Samia GHALI, Messrs Serge GODARD, Jean-Pierre GODEFROY, Didier GUILLAUME, Edmond HERVÉ, Ms Annie JARRAUD-VERGNOLLE, Messrs Claude JEANNEROT, Ronan KERDRAON, Ms Virginie KLÈS, Messrs Yves KRATTINGER, Serge LAGAUCHE, Serge LARCHER, Jacky LE MENN, Roger MADEC, Jacques MAHÉAS, Rachel MAZUIR, Jean-Jacques MIRASSOU, Ms Renée NICOUX, Mr François PATRIAT, Ms Gisèle PRINTZ, Messrs Marcel RAINAUD, Daniel RAOUL, Thierry REPENTIN, Ms Patricia SCHILLINGER, Mr Jean-Pierre SUEUR, Ms Catherine TASCA, Messrs Michel TESTON, René TEULADE, Jean-Marc TODESCHINI, Richard YUNG, Guy FISCHER, Ms Nicole BORVO COHEN-SEAT, Michelle DEMESSINE, Messrs Gérard LE CAM, Bernard VERA, Ms Annie DAVID, Ms Marie-France BEAUFILS, Messrs Jean-François VOGUET, Jack RALITE, Ms Marie-Agnès LABARRE, Ms Brigitte GONTHIER-MAURIN, Ms Éliane ASSASSI, Ms Evelyne DIDIER, Ms Mireille SCHURCH, Messrs Ivan RENAR, Robert HUE, Jean-Claude DANGLOT, Ms Isabelle PASQUET, Ms Odette TERRADE, Messrs Thierry FOUCAUD and Michel BILLOUT, Senators.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COUNCIL,

Having regard to the Constitution;

Having regard to Ordinance no. 58-1067 of 7 November 1958 as amended, concerning the basic law on the Constitutional Council;

Having regard to the Basic Law on Finance Laws, no. 2001-692 of 1 August 2001 as amended, as well as Decision no. 2001-448 DC of the Constitutional Council of 25 July 2001;

Having regard to the Code on the Entry and Residence of Foreigners and on the Right of Asylum;

Having regard to the General Local Authorities Code;

Having regard to the Criminal Code, as well as Decision no. 2007-554 DC of the Constitutional Council of 9 August 2007;

Having regard to the Code of Criminal Procedure;

Having regard to the Transportation Code;

Having regard to Ordinance n° 45-174 of 2 February 1945, as amended, relating to juvenile delinquency;

Having regard to Law no. 78-17 of 6 January 1978 on data processing, data files and individual freedoms;

Having regard to Law no. 83-629 of 12 July 1983 on the regulation of private security activities;

Having regard to Law no. 95-73 of 21 January 1995 laying down guidelines and policy relating to security, as well as Decision no. 94-352 DC of the Constitutional Council of 18 January 1995;

Having regard to Law no. 2003-239 of 18 March 2003 on internal security, as well as Decision no. 2003-467 DC of the Constitutional Council of 13 March 2003;

Having regard to Law no. 2004-575 of 21 June 2004 on trust in electronic commerce;

Having regard to the observations of the Government, registered on 25 February 2011;

Having regard to the written statements in response filed by the Members of Parliament and the Senators, registered on 2 and 3 March 2011;

Having heard the Rapporteurs;

1. Considering that the applicant Member of Parliament and the Senators have referred the law on guidelines and programming for the performance of internal security to the Constitutional Council; that they contest Articles 1, 4, 11, 18, 37, 38, 41, 43, 53, 58, 60, 61, 90, 92 and 101 of that Law;

• WITH RESPECT TO ARTICLE 1:

2. Considering that Article 1 provides: "The annexed report on the objectives and means of internal security for 2013 is approved";

3. Considering that, according to the applicants, the law referred cannot be classified as a programming law with the result that Article 1, which does not have legislative status, fails to respect the Constitution;

4. Considering that the twentieth subparagraph of Article 34 of the Constitution provides: "Programming Acts shall determine the objectives of the action of the State"; that by approving the annexed report on the objectives and means of internal security, Article 1 of the law implements this provision; that, accordingly, it is not unconstitutional;

• WITH RESPECT TO ARTICLE 4:

5. Considering that Article 4 of the law referred inserts two subparagraphs after the fourth subparagraph of paragraph I(7) of Article 6 of the aforementioned Law of 21 June 2004 which provide that: "Where justified by the requirements of combating the distribution of pictures or representations of minors falling under Article 227-23 of the Criminal Code, the administrative authority shall notify the persons mentioned under paragraph I(1) hereof the electronic addresses of public online communications services which breach the provisions of this Article, to which these persons must promptly block access.

"A decree of the Conseil d'État shall determine the procedures governing the application of the previous subparagraph, including in particular those according to which any additional costs resulting from the obligations imposed on operators are to be compensated, if incurred";

6. Considering that the applicants submit, on the one hand, that the creation of a blocking device for electronic addresses providing access to certain websites amounts to an inappropriate or counterproductive measure and an excessive cost having regard to the objective pursued of combating the distribution of child pornography; that on the other hand, given the lack of judicial authorisation, the violation of the freedom of communication resulting from the inability to access these sites is claimed to be disproportionate;

7. Considering, in the first place, that the Constitutional Council does not have a general power of assessment and decision-making of the same nature as that of the legislator; that it cannot consider whether the objectives which the legislator set itself could have been achieved by other means, unless the procedures adopted by the law are manifestly inappropriate for the objective pursued; that by establishing a device which makes it possible to block access to public online communications services which distribute pornographic images containing children, the legislator did not commit any manifest error of assessment; that by providing that any additional costs resulting from the obligations imposed on operators could be compensated, if incurred, it did not violate the constitutional requirement of the proper use of public funds;

8. Considering, secondly, that the contested provisions only grant the administrative authority the power to limit access to public online communications services in order to protect internet users if and insofar as they distribute child pornography; that the decision of the administrative authority may be challenged at any time and by any interested party before the competent courts, if appropriate in summary proceedings; that, under these conditions, these provisions ensure that the objective of constitutional standing of safeguarding public order is reconciled with the freedom of communication guaranteed under Article 11 of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen in a manner that is not disproportionate;

• WITH RESPECT TO ARTICLE 11:

9. Considering that Article 11 codifies in Articles 230-6 to 230-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, by amendment, the provisions of Article 21 of the aforementioned Law of 18 March 2003 on criminal records files;

10. Considering that the applicants argue that although the Constitutional Council already upheld the constitutionality of the provisions codified by Article 11 of the law referred in its aforementioned decision of 13 March 2003, a change in circumstances after this decision justifies a re-examination of these provisions; that they point out in this regard that, in its report on the control of the system for processing criminal offences discovered submitted to the Prime Minister on 20 January 2009, the National Commission for Information Technology and Freedoms [Commission nationale de l'informatique et des libertés] concluded that, in a significant number of cases, the files of the individuals that had been called into question were imprecise and that the provisions regulating the processing of and rectifications to these files were "manifestly ineffective", while the number of persons registered was considerable; that they also challenge as unjustified and unintelligible the difference in the arrangements governing the cancellation of data established under Article 230-8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure between data collected in cases in which proceedings were discontinued, depending upon whether the decision to discontinue was motivated by the fact that the charges were insufficient or on other grounds;

11. Considering that, in its aforementioned Decision of 13 March 2003, the Constitutional Council upheld the constitutionality of Article 21 and Article 25 of the Law of 18 March 2003 on internal security, subject to the reservations contained in recitals 26, 34, 35, 38 and 43 to its decision; that it ruled that the Law of 6 January 1978 on data processing, data files and individual freedoms applies to the processing concerned and that all persons included in the files must be able to exercise their right to access and gain rectification of the data concerning them, subject to the conditions specified under Article 39 of this Law; that, when these data are consulted in relation to administrative investigations, they may only be used as an element of the decision taken by the administrative authority, which may be reviewed by the courts; that the use of these data cannot make it possible to call into question the acquisition of French nationality if, pursuant to law, this is due as a right; that it can no longer prevent the renewal of a residence permit if, pursuant to law, this is due as a right or if this is required by the requirement to respect the right of each individual to lead a normal family life; that finally, where minors are involved, it is for the decree to determine the period of conservation by reconciling, on the one hand, the need to identify the authors of criminal offences, and on the other hand the need to seek the educational and moral rehabilitation of young offenders;

12. Considering that the amendments made to the provisions of Article 21 of the aforementioned Law of 18 March 2003 at the time of their introduction into Articles 230-6 to 230-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure reinforce the control of the judicial authorities over the data recorded in criminal records files; that Article 230-8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that the public prosecutor or the judge responsible for overseeing the implementation and updating of processing shall rule within one month on the follow-up action that is to be taken in respect of applications for cancellation or rectification; that this Article also provides that all data relating to individuals that are called into question and kept in the criminal records files notwithstanding a decision to release the individual, an acquittal, a ruling that there is no case to answer or a decision to discontinue proceedings, irrespective of the reasons, must be subject to an annotation prohibiting access to these data in the context of administrative investigations; that the difference in the arrangements governing the conservation of data resulting from the right granted to the public prosecutor to order cancellation if the decision to discontinue was motivated by the fact that the charges were insufficient is based on the fact that in this case there is no interest in conserving such data in the files;

13. Considering that it follows from the above that, subject to the same reservations as those referred to in recital 11, the provisions of Articles 230-6 to 230-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are constitutional, provided that they are not obscure or ambiguous;

• WITH RESPECT TO ARTICLE 18:

14. Considering that Article 18 amends Article 10 of the aforementioned Law of 21 January 1995 on videoprotection; that it completes the list of cases in which such a device may be deployed on a public highway by the competent authorities; that it reinforces the control powers of departmental videoprotection commissions and the National Commission for Information Technology and Freedoms and permits the consultation of the "national videoprotection commission" in certain cases;

15. Considering that the eleventh subparagraph to paragraph II of Article 10, as resulting from Article 18(1) of the law referred relaxes the arrangements governing the deployment of video surveillance devices by legal persons under private law; that it provides: "Provided that they inform the mayor of the municipality concerned, other legal persons may deploy a videoprotection system on a public highway in order to ensure the protection of the surroundings to their buildings and installations in locations that are liable to be exposed to acts of terrorism or particularly exposed to risks of assault or theft";

16. Considering that letters b) and c) of Article 18(2) permit the usage and viewing of video surveillance from a public highway to be delegated to private individuals; that the last phrase of the second subparagraph of paragraph III of Article 10 of the Law of 21 January 1995 as amended provides that: "The images may be viewed by agents of the public authorities or employees of the legal person which holds the authorisation or by those of public or private operators acting on their behalf under the terms of a contract"; that pursuant to the third and fourth subparagraphs of paragraph III: "If a public authority or a legal person does not itself make use of its video protection system on a public highway, the agreement that it concludes with a public or private operator shall be approved by a representative of the State in the department, or in Paris by the chief of police, after having informed the mayor of the municipality concerned, and in accordance with a framework agreement determined by regulation in the light of the opinion of the national commission provided for under Article 10-2. Moreover, the employees of the private operator with responsibility for using the system shall be subject to the provisions of Title I of Law no. 83-629 of 12 July 1983 regulating private security activities, except Articles 3 to 3-2 and 10 thereof, and shall be subject to a duty of professional secrecy.

"If a public authority does not use the system itself, the employees of the private company that do so under its control and on its behalf may not have access to the recordings of images taken on a public highway";

17. Considering that, according to the applicants, by authorising private individuals to carry out surveillance on public highways, these provisions amount to a delegation to such persons of tasks inherent in the exercise by the State of its sovereign tasks and violate the constitutional requirements associated with the protection of individual freedom and private life;

18. Considering that Article 12 of the 1789 Declaration provides: "The security of the rights of man and of the citizen requires public order forces: these forces are, therefore, established for the good of all and not for the personal advantage of those to whom they shall be entrusted;

19. Considering that by authorising all legal persons to deploy surveillance devices beyond the "immediate" surroundings to their buildings and installations and in granting private operators the task of using video protection systems on public highways and viewing the images on behalf of public bodies, the contested provisions enable the vesting of private individuals with general surveillance duties of public highways; that each of these provisions thereby makes it possible to delegate to a private individual general administrative policing powers that are inherent in the exercise of the "public order force" that is necessary to guarantee rights; that, accordingly, the twelfth subparagraph of Article 18(1) and letters b) and c) of Article 18(2) must be ruled unconstitutional; that, consequently, the first subparagraph of Article 18(1) of the law referred must replace only the first subparagraph of paragraph II of Article 10 of the Law of 21 January 1995 with the ten subparagraphs provided for under Article 18(1);

• WITH RESPECT TO ARTICLE 37:

20. Considering that paragraph I of Article 37 inserts Article 132-19-2 into the Criminal Code; that pursuant to this new Article, the minimum term of imprisonment for offences involving voluntary violence against the person, aggravated due to its consequences for the victims, the status of the victim or of the author, the manner in which it is committed or the place of the offence, as provided for under Articles 222-9, 222-12 and 222-13 of Article 222-14(3), Article 222-14-1(4) and Article 222-15-1 is set at eighteen months or two years, depending upon whether the offence is punished by a term of seven or ten years' imprisonment; that pursuant to the same Article, taking account of the circumstances of the offence, the personality of the author or the guarantees provided by the latter as to his integration or reintegration, the courts may impose a sentence shorter than these thresholds or a non-custodial sentence; that paragraph II of Article 37 amends the aforementioned Ordinance of 2 February 1945 in order to extend the application of Article 132-19-2 of the Criminal Code to minors;

21. Considering that, according to the applicants, paragraph I of Article 37 violates the principles of the necessity and the individual determination of sentences guaranteed under Article 8 of the 1789 Declaration; that paragraph II also runs contrary to the fundamental principle recognised under the laws of the Republic in relation to criminal justice for minors;

As regards paragraph I:

22. Considering that Article 8 of the 1789 Declaration provides that: "The law shall provide for such punishments only as are strictly and obviously necessary…"; that pursuant to Article 34 of the Constitution: "Statutes shall determine the rules concerning… the determination of serious crimes and other major offences and the penalties they carry"; that Article 61 of the Constitution does not grant the Constitutional Council a general power of assessment and decision-making of the same nature as that of Parliament, but solely grants it the power to rule on the constitutionality of the laws placed before it for examination; that, whereas the necessity of the penalties associated with offences falls within the margin of appreciation of the legislator, it is for the Constitutional Court to ensure that the sentence liable to be imposed is not manifestly disproportionate with the offence;

23. Considering in the first place that the contested provision only applies to attacks against the physical integrity of other persons characterised by at least one or more aggravating circumstance and punished by a term of imprisonment of at least seven years; that it only establishes the principle of minimum sentences of at least eighteen months' or two years' imprisonment for particularly serious offences;

24. Considering, secondly, that in each case the court may impose, by a specially motivated decision, a sentence lower than these thresholds or a non-custodial sentence taking account of the circumstances of the offence, the personality of the author or the guarantees provided by the latter as to his integration or reintegration; that accordingly, the legislator did not change the power of the courts to order, subject to the conditions provided for under Articles 132-40 and 132-41 of the Criminal Code, that the sentence be suspended at least in part and the person convicted be released on probation; that there has been no derogation from the special provisions contained in the second subparagraph of Article 122-1 of the Criminal Code which provides that if at the time the offence was committed the author was affected by a psychiatric or neuro-psychiatric disorder that modified his perception or impaired his control over his actions, the court shall take account of this fact when imposing the sentence and determining sentencing arrangements;

25. Considering that it follows that paragraph I of Article 37 is constitutional;

As regards paragraph II:

26. Considering that the mitigation of the criminal responsibility of minors depending on the age, as the need to search for the educational and moral reconstruction of juvenile delinquents through measures adapted to their age and personality, imposed by a specialised court or according to appropriate procedures, has been constantly recognised by the laws of the Republic since the beginning of the twentieth century; that these principles are notably reflected in the law of 12 April 1906 on the legal majority of minors; the law of 22 July 1912 on Juvenile Courts and the Ordinance of 2 February 1945 on juvenile delinquency; that, however, Republican legislation before the coming into force of the Constitution of 1946 did not establish any rule according to which binding measures or penalties should always be avoided in favour of purely educational measures; that in particular, the original provisions of the Ordinance of 2 February 1945 did not rule out the criminal responsibility of minors and did not exclude, if necessary, measures being imposed on them such as fostering, supervision, detention or, for minors older than thirteen years of age, custody; that such is the scope of the fundamental principle recognised by the laws of the Republic in terms of juvenile justice;

27. Considering that in establishing the principle of minimum sentences applicable to minors who have never been convicted of an offence or misdemeanour, the contested provision violates the constitutional principles applicable to criminal justice for minors; that accordingly, paragraph II of Article 37 must be ruled unconstitutional;

• WITH RESPECT TO ARTICLE 38:

28. Considering that Article 38 amends Articles 221-3 and 221-4 of the Criminal Code; that it has the effect of extending to those convicted of the murder or manslaughter of "a judge, a officer in the national police force, an officer in the gendarmerie, a member of the prison administration staff or any other person vested with public authority when exercising or due to the exercise of his duties" the provisions whereby the Assize Court may by a special ruling either extend the minimum period which must be passed in imprisonment until up to thirty years or, if it imposes a life sentence, rule that none of the measures referred to under Article 132-23 of the same Code may be granted to the person convicted;

29. Considering that, according to the applicants, since they only consider the status of the victims and not the circumstances in which the offence was committed, these provisions violate the principle of the necessity of penalties guaranteed under Article 8 of the 1789 Declaration;

30. Considering that the enforcement of custodial sentences in matters relating to criminal justice has been conceived not only in order to protect society and to assure the punishment of the convicted individual, but also in order to favour his rehabilitation and to prepare for his eventual re-integration;

31. Considering that, according to Article 720-4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, if the Assize Court has ruled that none of the measures referred to under Article 132-23 of the Criminal Code may be granted to an individual sentenced to life imprisonment, the Sentencing Court may grant one of these measures if the convicted individual has been imprisoned for at least thirty years; that this provision must be deemed to provide the public prosecutor and the convicted individual the right to apply to the Sentencing Court; that this procedure may be repeated depending upon the circumstances; that having regard to these requirements, the contested provisions, which the courts must apply in cases involving the murder or manslaughter of a person vested with public authority when exercising his duties or due to the exercise thereof are not manifestly contrary to the principle of the necessity of penalties; that accordingly the provisions of Article 38 of the Law referred are not unconstitutional;

• WITH RESPECT TO ARTICLE 41:

32. Considering that Article 41 inserts Article 8-3 into the aforementioned Ordinance of 2 February 1945 according to which: "The public prosecutor may prosecute a minor before the Juvenile Court according to the procedure provided for under Article 390-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure if additional investigations regarding the facts are not necessary and investigations regarding the personality of the minor have been completed, depending upon the circumstances, during a procedure initiated no earlier than the six previous months or a procedure that resulted in a conviction no earlier than the six previous months.

"The summons to appear shall specify that the minor must be accompanied by a lawyer and that, should the minor or his legal representatives fail to choose a lawyer, the Public Prosecutor or the Juvenile Court shall arrange for the president of the bar association to appoint a lawyer ex officio.
"The summons shall also be served as quickly as possible on the parents, guardian or the person or service under whose care the minor has been placed.
"It shall be confirmed by a report signed by the minor and the person upon whom it has been served, who shall receive a copy";

33. Considering that, according to the applicants, these provisions, which permit a minor to be summoned before a Juvenile Court according to the arrangements of the law of criminal procedure applicable to adults, violate the fundamental principle recognised under the laws of the Republic in matters relating to criminal justice for minors; that they object in particular to the absence of an age limit and a threshold relating to the seriousness of the offence prosecuted as a prerequisite for the implementation of this procedure, the possibility to require the minor to appear within a time limit shorter than ten days as well as the lack of guarantees that the Juvenile Court has of recent information concerning the minor's personality;

34. Considering that the contested provisions authorise the public prosecutor to arrange for a minor to be summoned to appear before the Juvenile Court directly by a senior criminal investigation police officer without any preparatory examination by the children's judge; that these provisions apply to all minors irrespective of their age, the state of their police record and the seriousness of the offences prosecuted; that they do not guarantee that the court will have access to recent information concerning the minor's personality such as to permit it to seek his educational and moral rehabilitation; that, accordingly, they violate the constitutional requirements relating to criminal justice for minors; that Article 41 must be ruled unconstitutional;

• WITH RESPECT TO ARTICLE 43:

35. Considering that paragraph I of Article 43 grants the possibility to the Prefect to impose curfews on minors aged under thirteen between 11.00 pm and 6.00 am, subject to the twofold condition that this measure be taken in the interest of the minors and with the purpose of preventing a "manifest risk to their health, safety, education or morality"; that paragraph II of this Article, which amends Article 15-1 of the Ordinance of 2 February 1945, provides that the Juvenile Court may issue a ruling supported by reasons, with regard to educational penalties, imposing a "curfew on the minor between 11.00 pm and 6.00 am unless he is accompanied by a parent or guardian for a maximum period of three months, which may be renewed once"; that paragraph III of this Article provides that general decisions taken on the basis of paragraph I, and individual decisions taken on the basis of paragraph II, shall specify the procedure governing the collection of the minor and his immediate release to his parent or guardian; that it punishes the fact that the latter "fail to ensure that the measure is complied with" by the fine provided for in relation to category three offences; that paragraph IV of this Article requires the public prosecutor to inform the Prefect of alternative measures to prosecutions and judgments that have become definitive if these measures or judgments concern offences committed by minors resident in the department in order that the latter may if appropriate involve the Chairman of the Departmental Council;

36. Considering that, according to the applicants, by providing for a specific procedure for informing the Prefect of measures and judgments concerning minors, this provision violates the fundamental principle recognised under the law of the Republic in matters relating to criminal justice for minors and, in particular, the principle that the criminal responsibility of minors be mitigated in line with their age;

37. Considering that the contested provision subjects the transmission of the information concerning the minor by the public prosecutor to the Prefect to the requirement that it be requested by that latter with a view, depending upon the circumstances, to apply to the President of the Departmental Council in order to implement a parental responsibility contract; that it has neither the goal or effect of modifying the arrangements governing the criminal responsibility of minors; that, accordingly, the objection averring the violation of the principle of the mitigation of the criminal responsibility of minors in line with their age must be rejected;

38. Considering moreover that pursuant to Article 9 of the 1789 Declaration, all men are presumed innocent until found guilty; that it follows that in principle the legislator cannot establish the presumption of guilt in matters relating to criminal law; that such presumptions may nonetheless be established on an exceptional basis, in particular in relation to administrative offences, provided that they are not non-rebuttable presumptions, that respect for the right to a defence is guaranteed and that the facts reasonably lead to the plausibility of guilt ;

39. Considering, in this case, that the last subparagraph of paragraph III of Article 43 imposes a fine on the legal representative of a minor who has not ensured the latter's compliance with the decision provided for under paragraph I or paragraph II; that by permitting the punishment of the legal representative due to an offence committed by the minor, it has the effect of establishing a non-rebuttable presumption of guilt against the legal representative;

40. Considering that it follows from the above that the last subparagraph of paragraph III of Article 43 of the law referred must be ruled unconstitutional; that the remaining provisions of Article 43 are constitutional;

• WITH RESPECT TO ARTICLE 53:

41. Considering that Article 53 on the one hand introduces Article L. 443-2-1 into the Commercial Code and on the other hand amends L. 443-3 thereof; that pursuant to the new Article L. 443-2-1, "the offer, placing on sale or offering with a view to sale on a public online communications network of entry tickets or passes granting access to a sporting, cultural or trade events in order to derive benefit without the authorisation of the producer or organiser or proprietor of the rights to exploit such an event" is punished by a fine of 15,000 Euros; that any natural person found guilty of this offence shall moreover be subject to the complementary penalty of the confiscation of the object which was used or intended to commit the offence or of the object resulting from the offence; that pursuant to Article L. 443-3 as amended, any legal person found to be criminally responsible for the same offence shall be liable, in addition to the aforementioned fine multiplied by five, to the penalties provided for under Article 131-39 of the Criminal Code;

42. Considering that the applicants argue in the first place that these provisions introduce rules into the Commercial Code which do not only relate to traders or companies and do not define the concept of benefit; that they accordingly violate the requirement with constitutional standing that the law be intelligible and accessible; that they moreover violate the principle of the necessity of punishments insofar as they impinge excessively on the ownership rights and freedom of contract of natural persons, as well as the freedom of enterprise of legal persons; that finally they discriminate between those who sell tickets over a "public online communications network" and those who carry out the same transaction in another manner;

43. Considering that by prohibiting the resale of entry tickets or other passes granting access without the prior agreement of the organisers, the legislator sought to prevent and punish any nuisances resulting from the circumvention of the provisions implemented for certain sporting events and to maintain the rights of the producers or organisers of or proprietors of the rights to exploit such events; that, nonetheless, by punishing the re-sale or offer to do so over a public online communications network with a view to deriving benefit in relation to all cultural, sporting or trade events, the legislator based its action on criteria that were manifestly inappropriate in relation to the objective pursued; that accordingly, Article 53 of the law referred violates the principle of the necessity of crimes and punishments; that it must be ruled unconstitutional, without any requirement to examine the other challenges;

• WITH RESPECT TO ARTICLE 58:

44. Considering that Article 58 of the law referred replaces the second subparagraph of Article L. 2241-2 of the Transport Code with the three following subparagraphs: "If the author of the offence refuses or states that he is unable to prove his identity, the officers mentioned under the first subparagraph of paragraph II of Article 529-4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure shall inform a senior criminal investigation police officer with territorial jurisdiction thereof as quickly as possible using any means.

"The author of the offence shall be required to remain with an officer falling under subparagraph one for as long as is necessary in order to inform a senior criminal investigation police officer and for the latter to take a decision.
"Acting on the instructions of a senior criminal investigation police officer, the officers may bring the author of the offence before the former or detain the minor for as long as is necessary for the former or a criminal investigation police officer acting under his supervision to arrive";

45. Considering that the applicants argue that the new wording of Article L. 2241-2 removes the obligation of diligence consisting in the rule that they may not detain the author of the offence for longer than the "time strictly necessary" for the senior criminal investigation police officer to arrive or for the minor to be brought before the former "in the field"; that they consider that the legislator has failed to exercise its powers properly in not specifying with sufficient clarity the period of time for which the author of the offence may be detained by the transport officers, and has thereby deprived of legal guarantees the constitutional principles requiring that individual freedom and freedom of movement be protected;

46. Considering that Article 66 of the Constitution provides: “No one shall be arbitrarily detained. − The Judicial Authority, guardian of the freedom of the individual, shall ensure compliance with this principle under the conditions laid down in law”;

47. Considering that the contested provisions concern the special powers of assistant criminal investigation police officers performing their duties on rail-based or other guided public transport; that they provide for the detention of the author of an offence if the latter refuses or states that he is unable to prove his identity, "for as long as is necessary in order to inform a senior criminal investigation police officer and for the latter to take a decision" or "for as long as is necessary for the former or a criminal investigation police officer acting under his supervision to arrive"; that they imply that the operator's officer must inform the senior criminal investigation police officer and the latter must take a decision as quickly as possible; that, under these conditions, the restrictions imposed on a person who is not able or does not wish to prove his identity on the spot are limited to that which is necessary in order to safeguard goals of general interest with constitutional standing, the pursuit of which justifies the verification of that person's identity; that accordingly the contested provisions, which do not amount to a failure by the legislator to exercise its powers properly, do not violate either individual freedom, which Article 66 of the Constitution specifies is to be protected by the judiciary, or the freedom of movement;

• WITH RESPECT TO ARTICLES 60 AND 61:

48. Considering that, on the one hand, Article 60 of the law referred inserts Article L. 332-16-1 into the Sporting Code; that it permits the Minister of the Interior to "prevent the individual or collective movement of persons who take advantage of their status as supporters of a team or who behave as such at the location of a sporting event and whose presence is liable to create serious trouble for public order"; that, on the other hand, Article 61 inserts Article L. 332-16-2 into the same Code; that it authorises the departmental prefects to "restrict the freedom of movement of persons who take advantage of their status as supporters of a team or who behave as such at the location of a sporting event and whose presence is liable to create serious trouble for public order"; that these articles provide that the order of the Minister or the prefect shall determine the duration of the measure, the precise factual circumstances which justify it, as well as its geographical scope; that they provide for custodial sentences, fines and court-imposed bans from stadiums in the event that these orders are not complied with;

49. Considering that the applicants object that the provisions concerned violate freedom of movement and do not sufficiently regulate the administrative policing powers granted to the Minister of the Interior and the prefects;

50. Considering that the contested provisions reinforce administrative policing powers in situations involving large gatherings of persons at sporting events which are liable to result in serious disturbances for public order; that it is for the administrative authorities, acting under the control of the courts, to determine on the basis of objective criteria and in a precise manner the persons or classes of persons who are to be subject to measures restricting their movement; that these measures must be justified by the requirement to safeguard public order and not to cause a disproportionate restriction on freedom of movement; that they may be challenged by the interested parties before the administrative courts, in particular during emergency appeals by persons on remand [référé-liberté]; that having regard to the objectives which the legislator has set itself and the body of guarantees that it has provided for, the contested provisions are capable of providing a reconciliation which is not manifestly imbalanced between the compliance of the freedom of movement and the safeguard of public order;

• WITH RESPECT TO PARAGRAPHS I AND II OF ARTICLE 90:

51. Considering that pursuant to the first subparagraph of paragraph I of Article 90 of the law referred: "If unlawful group settlement on land belonging to a public or private individual with a view to establishing their residence there entails serious risks for public decorum, safety or peace, the State's representative in the department, or in Paris the chief of police, may serve notice on the occupants to leave the area"; that the second subparagraph provides that the notice to leave is to be implemented in forty eight hours and specifies the procedures whereby it is to be rendered public; that the third subparagraph provides that the prefect may carry out the compulsory evacuation of the area, unless objected to by the owner or the holder of the right to use it if the notice to leave the area has not been complied with and has not been the object of an appeal with suspensory effect as provided for under paragraph II; that the State's representative may also apply to the president of the regional court for authorisation to destroy the unlawful constructions, who "shall rule according to summary proceedings within forty eight hours";

52. Considering that, according to the applicants, these provisions violate the constitutional requirements which require respect for human dignity, the guarantee of rights, freedom of movement, the respect for private life, the inviolability of the home and the presumption of innocence;

53. Considering that the administrative policing measures liable to affect the exercise of rights guaranteed under the Constitution, which include freedom of movement, comprising the individual freedom protected under Articles 2 and 4 of the 1789 Declaration must be justified by the need to safeguard public order and must be proportionate with this objective;

54. Considering that the first subparagraph of paragraph I of Article 90 grants the State representative in the department, or in Paris the chief of police, the power to serve notice on individuals illegally occupying the land of others to leave the area since they have settled there as a group with a view to establishing their residence there and this settlement entails serious risks for public decorum, safety or peace; that, in this regard, the contested provisions are justified by the need to safeguard public order and are proportional with this objective;

55. Considering nonetheless that the second and third subparagraphs of the same paragraph permit the State representative to enforce the compulsory evacuation of the area if the notice to leave within at least forty eight hours determined by the latter has not been complied with and has not been the object of an appeal with suspensory effect as provided for under paragraph II; that these provisions permit the evacuation to be enforced on an urgent basis at any time of year, without taking account of the personal or family circumstances of underprivileged individuals who do not have a decent abode; that the right granted to these individuals to appeal to the administrative courts, which will have suspensory effect, cannot in this case provide a sufficient guarantee in order to ensure that the need to safeguard public order and the rights and freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution are reconciled with one another in a manner that is not manifestly imbalanced;

56. Considering that it follows that paragraphs I and II of Article 90 of the law referred, which amount to an inseparable whole, must be ruled unconstitutional;

• WITH RESPECT TO ARTICLE 92:

57. Considering that Article 92 of the law referred replaces the following reference in the first subparagraph of Article 78-2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: "21-1" with the reference: "21"; that it has the objective of adding all assistant criminal investigation police officers, and in particular municipal police officers, to the list of individuals authorised to carry out identity controls, whereas the only assistant criminal investigation police officers who may currently do so subject to the strict conditions specified under Article 78-2 are the officers on active service from the national police who do not meet the prerequisites for classification as criminal investigation police officers;

58. Considering that the applicants consider that the extension of the possibility of carrying out identity controls to all assistant criminal investigation police officers does not offer sufficient guarantees against arbitrary attacks on individual freedom;

59. Considering that it follows from Article 66 of the Constitution that the criminal investigation police must be placed under the direction and control of the judicial authority; that to this effect, the Code of Criminal Procedure, in particular Articles 16 to 19-1, ensures the direct and effective control by the judicial authority over the senior criminal investigation police officers charged with exercising judicial powers of investigation and implementing the restrictive measures necessary in order to achieve them; that Article 20 of the Code of Criminal Procedure specifies the list of criminal investigation police officers charged with "assisting senior criminal investigation police when exercising their functions; recording all types of offences and drafting reports thereof; making reports of the statements made to them by any person capable of providing them with indications, evidence or information regarding the authors and accomplices of these offences"; that the requirement of direction and control by the judicial authority over the criminal investigation police cannot be respected if general powers of criminal investigation are granted to officers who, due to the fact that they are answerable to the municipal authorities, are not under the control of senior criminal investigation police officers;

60. Considering that Article 78-2 of the Criminal Code specifies the cases in which senior criminal investigation police officers, ordinary criminal investigation police officers and the officers on active service from the national police do not meet the prerequisites specified for classification as criminal investigation police officers may carry out identity controls and verify identities within the ambit of their duties as criminal investigation police officers or following a written request from the public prosecutor; that by also granting this power to municipal police officers who, due to the fact that they are answerable to the municipal authorities, are not under the control of senior criminal investigation police officers, Article 92 violates Article 66 of the Constitution; that accordingly it must be ruled unconstitutional;

• WITH RESPECT TO ARTICLE 101:

61. Considering that Article 101 of the Law referred has the object of inserting after the word: "retention", the words: "or within it" into the last phrase of Article L. 552-1 of the Code on the Entry and Residence of Foreigners and on the Right of Asylum, pursuant to which: "Nonetheless, if a courtroom allocated to the Ministry of Justice permitting it to rule in public has been especially fitted out in the immediate vicinity of this place of detention, it shall rule in this room"; that Article 101 accordingly authorises the Custodial Judge to hold the hearing concerning the extension of an administrative detention order in excess of forty eight hours in a courtroom located within, and no longer solely close to, the administrative detention centre;

62. Considering that, according to the applicants, these provisions violate the rules governing a fair trial and the requirements that hearings be held in public;

63. Considering that the administrative detention centres are detention facilities intended to host foreign nationals who do not have the right to reside in France pending their voluntary return or forced repatriation to their country of origin or a third country; that these centres are not open to the public; that accordingly, by providing that the courtroom in which the Custodial Judge sits may be located "within" these centres, the legislator has adopted a measure which is manifestly inappropriate in relation to the need, to which it refers, to "rule in public"; that it follows that Article 101 of the law referred must be ruled unconstitutional, without any need to examine the objections presented by the applicants;

• WITH RESPECT TO THE OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE LAW REFERRED:

As regards Article 10:

64. Considering that Article 10 creates a fund to provide support to the technical and scientific police, which is responsible for contributing to the funding, insofar as compatible with its resources, of all operations related to the input of information into and usage of the automatised fingerprint register and the automatised DNA register; that it provides that this fund is to be "financed by a payment, the amount of which shall be generally determined in line with the value of the assets returned to the insurance company that paid compensation for the theft of the said goods";

65. Considering that Article 12 of the 1789 Declaration provides: "The security of the rights of man and of the citizen requires public order forces: these forces are, therefore, established for the good of all and not for the personal advantage of those to whom they shall be entrusted"; that Article 13 provides: “A common contribution is essential for the maintenance of the public forces and for the cost of administration: This should be equitably distributed among all the citizens in proportion to their means";

66. Considering that, according to the first subparagraph of paragraph II of Article 17 of the aforementioned basic law of 1 August 2001, contribution funds shall be comprised in particular of "funds not generated through taxation paid by legal or natural persons in order to contribute to expenditure in the public interest"; that the last subparagraph of this paragraph provides that the use of credits established through contribution funds "must comply with the intention of the party that made the payment"; that the manner in which the criminal investigating police is to exercise its functions cannot however be subject to the wishes of private individuals; that accordingly, by creating a fund to provide support to the technical and scientific police and in allocating to it the contributions paid by insurers, Article 10 violates the constitutional requirements resulting from Articles 12 and 13 of the 1789 Declaration;

As regards Article 14:

67. Considering that Article 14 of the law referred inserts into Title IV of Book I of the Code of Criminal Procedure a Chapter III dedicated to judicial cooperation software and including Articles 230-20 to 230-27; that pursuant to Article 230-20: "With a view to facilitating the gathering of evidence of offences and the identification of their authors, the national police and national gendarmerie services charged with carrying out tasks for the criminal investigation police may, under the control of the judicial authority, implement software intended to facilitate the exploitation and linkage of information on combined operations by these services in course:

"1. of preliminary investigations, flagrancy investigations or investigations carried out pursuant to rogatory commission;
"2. of procedures to investigate the cause of death or disappearance provided for under Articles 74 and 74-1";

68. Considering that pursuant to Article 230-21: "The data processed by the software falling under this Chapter may only originate from papers and documents of judicial proceedings already held by the services referred to under Article 230-20.

"If data that can indirectly disclose the identity of individuals is processed, their identities may only appear once the linkage operations have been completed, and solely for the data that has actually been corroborated internally or with other information processed by the software";

69. Considering that the freedom proclaimed under Article 2 of the 1789 Declaration is premised on the respect for private life; that it is for the competent legislature to determine, pursuant to Article 34 of the Constitution, the rules of criminal procedure, to ensure the conciliation between, on the one hand, the safeguarding of public order and the search for the authors of offences, both necessary in order to protect principles and rights with constitutional standing, and on the other hand, the requirement to respect private life and other rights and freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution;

70. Considering that the use of judicial linkage software enables the personal data collected during judicial investigations opened for all categories of offences, irrespective of their seriousness, to be processed; that it is for the legislator to adopt guarantees of such a nature as to ensure that the aforementioned objectives and principles with constitutional standing are reconciled with one another, taking account of the general scope of application of this software ;

71. Considering in the first place that the provisions of Articles 230-20 et seq. do not have the object and cannot have the effect of permitting the implementation of the general processing of the data collected during the various investigations mentioned under Article 230-20; that Article 230-23 provides that, without prejudice to the control powers granted to the National Commission for Information Technology and Freedoms, the processing of personal data through judicial linkage software shall occur under the control of the public prosecutor or the investigating judge with jurisdiction; that accordingly, this software may only result in the implementation - authorised by these judicial authorities - of the processing of specific personal data in relation to a specific investigation or procedure concerning a range of facts and for the sole purposes of these investigations;

72. Considering secondly that the first subparagraph of Article 230-22 provides: "Any personal data revealed through the processing during the inquiries and investigations referred to under paragraph 1 of Article 230-20 shall be deleted upon conclusion of the investigation and, in any case, after a period of three years from the last registration"; that having regard to the possibility established by the aforementioned provisions to register data even where associated with events with a low degree of seriousness, the conservation of these data cannot be extended on the initiative of the investigating body for longer than three years after their registration; that accordingly the words: "after their last registration" must be struck out as unconstitutional;

73. Considering that, subject to the reservations contained in recital 71 and taking account of the partial ruling of unconstitutionality regarding Article 230-22, the provisions of Article 14 do not violate the aforementioned constitutional requirements;

As regards Article 32:

74. Considering that Article 32 restores into the aforementioned Law of 12 July 1983 a Title III concerning private economic intelligence activities comprised of Articles 33-12 to 33-16; that Article 33-12 seeks to define the scope of the regime of economic intelligence activities; that Articles 33-13 and 33-14 subject the management of an economic intelligence undertaking and the exercise of that activity by an undertaking respectively to an approval or authorisation issued by the Ministry of the Interior; that Article 33-15 establishes the principle of the prohibition for various classes of official and agent working within the intelligence services from carrying on that activity for a period of three years after the time when they ceased to perform their duties; that Article 33-16 punishes violations of the aforementioned rules with fines and custodial sentences as well as complementary penalties of interdiction or closure;

75. Considering that the legislator is free to provide for new offences and to determine the penalties applicable to them; that in doing so, it is required on the one hand to ensure that the requirements of public order are reconciled with the guarantee of rights protected under the Constitution including freedom of enterprise, whilst it must on the other hand respect the requirements resulting from Articles 8 and 9 of the 1789 Declaration including the principle of the legality of offences and punishments, which requires the adoption of sufficiently precise provisions formulated in an unequivocal manner;

76. Considering that Article 33-13 brings into the scope of the authorisation regime private security activities consisting "in the search for and processing of information on the economic, social, commercial, industrial or financial environment of one or more natural or legal persons"; that it provides that the purpose of this authorisation regime is to permit natural or legal persons "to protect themselves against the risks that may threaten their economic activity, their assets, their intangible assets or their reputation" and to "promote their activity by exercising an influence on the development of business" or their "decisions"; that the lack of precision both in the definition of the activities liable to fall within the scope of economic intelligence as well as the objective justifying the attack against freedom of enterprise violate the principle of the legality of offences and penalties; that it follows that Article 33-13 and the other provisions introduced by Article 32 of the law referred, which constitute inseparable provisions, must be ruled unconstitutional;

As regards Article 91:

77. Considering that Article 91 of the law referred completes Article 20 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; that it grants the status of criminal investigation police officer to "members of the category of municipal police directors who assure the functional and operational direction of municipal police services if the agreement provided for under Article L. 2212-6 of the General Local Authorities Code makes provision to this effect"; that it grants them powers to assist the criminal investigation police officers referred to under Article 16 of the Code "in the exercise of their functions", except mayors and their assistants;

78. Considering that for the same reasons as those stated in recitals 59 and 60, Article 91 of the law referred, which grants the status of criminal investigation police officers to the members of the category of municipal police directors without providing them to senior criminal investigation police officers, violates Article 66 of the Constitution; that it must therefore be struck down as unconstitutional;

As regards paragraphs III of Article 90 and II of Article 123:

79. Considering that paragraph III of Article 90 of the law referred completes Article 226-4 of the Criminal Code as follows: "The occupation of the property of another without the authorisation of the owner or lessee following entry under the circumstances specified in the previous subparagraph and the refusal to leave immediately upon request by the owner or lessee shall be punished by the same penalties, unless permitted by law";

80. Considering that paragraph II of Article 123 of the law referred completes Article 362 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by permitting the President of the Assize Court to inform the jurors whether the accused has been banned from entering France and providing that the Court may decide to impose this penalty;

81. Considering that it follows from the scheme of Article 45 of the Constitution, and in particular its first subparagraph, according to which: "Every Government or Private Member's Bill shall be considered successively in the two Houses of Parliament with a view to the passing of an identical text", that the additions or amendments which may be introduced after the first reading by the Members of Parliament and by the Government must be directly related to a provision that remains under discussion; that nonetheless, any amendments intended to ensure compliance with the Constitution, to ensure coordination with texts subject to examination or to correct a material error are not subject to this last requirement;

82. Considering that in this case the amendments from which the aforementioned provisions originated were introduced during the second reading by the National Assembly; that at this stage of the proceedings these additions were not directly related to a provision that remained under discussion; that they were also not intended to ensure compliance with the Constitution, to ensure coordination with texts subject to examination or to correct a material error; that it follows that paragraphs III of Article 90 and II of Article 123 have been adopted according to a procedure that is unconstitutional;

83. Considering that there are no grounds for the Constitutional Council to raise any other question of compatibility with the Constitution ex officio,

HELD:

Article 1.- The following provisions of the Law on guidelines and programming for the performance of internal security are ruled unconstitutional:

• Article 10;
• in Article 14, the phrase "after the last registration" contained in Article 230-22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure;
• the twelfth subparagraph of Article 18(1) and letters b) and c) of Article 18(2);
• Article 32;
• subparagraph II of Article 37;
• Article 41;
• the last subparagraph of paragraph III of Article 43;
• Articles 53, 90, 91, 92 and 101;

As a consequence of the ruling that the twelfth subparagraph of Article 18(1) is unconstitutional, the first subparagraph of that provision must be replaced with the phrase: "The first subparagraph of paragraph II is replaced by ten subparagraphs drafted as follows: ».

Article 2.- The following provisions of the same Law are upheld as constitutional:

• Articles 1 and 4;
• in Article 11, Articles 230-6 to 230-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, subject to the reservations contained in recital 11;
• the remainder of Article 14, subject to the reservations contained in recital 71;
• subparagraph I of Article 37;
• Article 38;
• the remainder of Article 43;
• Articles 58, 60 and 61.

Article 3.- This decision shall be published in the Journal Officiel of the French Republic.

Deliberated by the Constitutional Council in its session on 10.03.11, sat on by: Mr Jean-Louis DEBRÉ, President, Mr Jacques BARROT, Mrs Claire BAZY MALAURIE, Messrs Guy CANIVET, Renaud DENOIX de SAINT MARC, Valéry GISCARD d'ESTAING, Mrs Jacqueline de GUILLENCHMIDT, Mr Hubert HAENEL and Mr Pierre STEINMETZ.